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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes whether CEOs who are good contrarian investors, good forecasters, 
or good market timers can run their firms better. Besides using the timing measure which 
combines returns before and after the trade, we also use the past return measure to estimate the 
contrarian aspect of CEO trades and the future return measure to assess CEO’s ability to forecast 
stock returns. Our results suggest that CEOs’ managerial talent and valuation ability are 
primarily related to CEOs’ past return measure, while high post-trade returns indicate the 
expropriation motive for CEO trades. Overall, we obtain strong evidence to support the idea that 
CEOs who are good contrarian investors tend to run their firms better on average than other 
CEOs.  
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1. Introduction  
The relationship between the characteristics of chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
organizational performance has been the subject of increased research attention in both strategic 
management and financial economics literature because the chief executive officer (CEO) is 
generally regarded as the most powerful organizational member. Given their leadership positions 
and compensation, CEOs likely have a significant impact on the success of the companies they 
run. In this paper, CEOs are characterized by a variable referred to as talent, and firms are also 
characterized by a single variable, namely firm performance. The impact of CEO talent on firm 
value appears to be quite significant (Hae and Ajay, 2012). In this study we define talent as an 
observable measure-the CEO’s trading performance in her own company’s stock.  
CEOs can positively affect firm performance by their ability to process economic 
information and make optimal decisions to increase shareholder value, and this ability may also 
help CEOs make investment decisions about their personal portfolios. We refer to this as a talent 
perspective. On the other hand, given inherent principal-agency conflicts in firms, CEOs can also 
adversely affect the firm performance by using private information to profit themselves at the 
expense of other shareholders, which can be formalized as the expropriation perspective. 
Therefore, whether successful trading performance is a good or bad CEO characteristic, that is its 
relationship with firm performance, is what we aim to test.  
Our work revisits the fundamental question of how important CEO trading performance 
is for firm performance, which is raised and explored by the study of Rubin and Vedrashko 
(2011). Their study concludes that CEOs who exhibit better trading performance also tend to run 
their companies well and outperform other firms in the same industry, that is, there is a positive 
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relation between CEO trading performance and firm performance, which demonstrates that talent 
perspective dominates the expropriation perspective. This holds not only when all transactions 
are analyzed together, but also when sales and purchases are analyzed separately. They also find 
a modest support for CEO trading performance predicting future firm performance in an out-of-
sample analysis. We extend the sample period of that study to include the five years after 2006. 
In contrast with the findings of Rubin and Vedrashko (2011), we found weak empirical support 
to the talent perspective with a mix of positive and negative coefficients in the analysis of all 
transactions types combined and in the separate sales/purchase transaction analysis. We also 
conduct a different procedure for out-of-sample analysis and find little support for the talent 
perspective.  
On top of reexamining the main argument in the Rubin and Vedrashko (2011) paper, our 
study offers a significant contribution. In Rubin and Vedrashko (2011), the underlying idea is to 
use the timing measure of CEO trading performance that is the sum of the return before the trade 
(past return) and the return after the trade (future return). The timing measure is designed to 
capture the timing ability of the trading CEO, i.e. the ability to buy low and sell high. Our use of 
the past return measure allows us to estimate the contrarian aspect of CEO trades. The future 
return measure allows us to assess CEO’s ability to forecast stock returns. In our study, we 
analyze the relationship between firm performance separately on past return and future return 
measures besides the timing measure.   
Prior research supports the hypothesis that insiders are contrarian traders. Seyhun (1992) 
shows that insiders are more likely to sell (purchase) shares following periods of significant price 
appreciation (declines), consistent with insider trading in anticipation of subsequent price 
reversals. Being a good contrarian can indicate either CEO expropriation or CEO valuation talent. 
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As a good contrarian, a CEO is able to assess the intrinsic value of the firm and identify any 
stock mispricing. A CEO with particularly good valuation ability is expected to make purchases 
(sales) when the stock is most undervalued (overvalued). In the talent perspective, this valuation 
ability is related to CEO ability to make optimal corporate decisions on promising projects, 
financing options and firm strategy. However, for example, if the CEO has negative private 
information about his/her firm, he/she can postpone her stock purchase until after the news is 
released and the stock price declines. In this case the CEO has used informational advantage to 
expropriate when he/she buys shares at the relatively low price. Similarly, waiting to sell shares 
until after positive news is released and followed by a stock price runup represents expropriation, 
which is measured by the pre-trade price runup.  
This valuation ability is best evaluated by the return prior to the trade. Accordingly, we 
try to estimate whether CEOs who are good contrarian investors can run their firms better. In our 
results, we find this is true when all transactions are considered, but this relation is especially 
strong in sales transactions.  
As for a good future return measure, it seems to be more related to good valuation talent. 
The after-trade return captures CEO’s forecasting ability on whether CEO can successfully 
anticipate the price change after the transaction.  Trueman (1986) suggests that managers provide 
earnings forecasts to signal their superior ability in anticipating future changes in the firm’s 
economic environment and adjusting the firm’s production plans accordingly. This, in turn, will 
increase the firm’s market value. However, favorable stock returns after the trade can also be 
expropriation if, for example, the CEO sells before bad news about the firm become public. The 
talent perspective predicts a positive relationship between CEO’s superior forecasting ability and 
firm performance. However, our test results show little support for our expectation and 
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demonstrate that good forecasters can actually negatively affect firm performance.  
We also measure whether CEO trading performance can predict future firm performance 
under that CEO in an out-of-sample test. Surprisingly, we find a negative correlation between 
CEO trading performance and future firm performance. 
To summarize, our results for the timing, past, and future measures indicate that CEOs’ 
managerial talent is most related to CEOs’ the past return measure. This measure captures the 
CEO’s ability to recognize when the firm’s stock is mispriced relative to its intrinsic value. We 
note that Warren Buffett is commonly associated with this type of valuation ability and a 
contrarian trading and investment pattern. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2: we describe our data and empirical analysis. In section 3: summary statistics on data 
are provided. In section 4: we present the model. Section 5 presents the empirical results of our 
model analysis on relationship between CEO trading performance and firm performance. Section 
6 concludes.  
2. Data Description 
This section details how we constructed the dataset and the collection process for each of 
our variables. 
      2.1 CEO Timing, Past Return, and Future Return Measures 
Our key explanatory variable is CEO talent. We proxy it by CEO trading performance. 
To capture it, we use the returns both before and after the CEO’s trades in her firm’s stock. For 
any forward-looking investors, a good trade strategy is to buy own-firm stocks at the lowest price 
and sell them at the highest price in order to maximize their returns. By their ability to better 
estimate firm’s underlying value and be more likely to identify any mispriced than average 
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investors in the market, CEOs are expected to follow the above strategy and find the best near 
points to trade. 
When purchase happens at the lowest point (lowest price), stock price has declined until 
this point and then rise.  When sale happens at the highest point (highest price), stock price has 
risen until this point and then decline. Therefore, in order to determine whether CEO trade near 
these points, we need to use both pre-trade and post-trade returns. 
Problems are inherent if we only use before-trade or after-trade return to determine 
whether a trade is timed well. Given a steady upward price trend, a purchase at the beginning of 
this trend and another purchase at the middle of this trend will both be evaluated as good trades if 
only based on post-trade return.  However, it is obvious that the purchase at the beginning of the 
upward trend is better than the later one in terms of earning potential.   More importantly, for 
sales, investors’ wealth would not be affected by a price change on the sold shares (post-sale 
return), while for purchase, investors’ wealth would not be affected by a price change on the not-
yet purchased shares (pre-purchase return).  Accordingly, a single pre- or post-trade return can 
not be consistently applied to both purchase and sales due to the inconsistent comparison on the 
quality of all trades in terms of the CEO’s wealth. 
Taken together, we would better determine whether a trade is timed too early or too late 
by combining both pre-trade and post-trade return, which generates the timing measure. To 
compute the timing measure, we sum the buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) before and after the 
trade. Precisely, for a purchase, the timing measure is the negative of the return from holding the 
shares for a certain length of time before the purchase plus the positive of the return for the same 
length of time after the purchase. For sale, the signs are reversed. That is, the timing measure is 
the positive of the return from holding the shares for a certain length of time before the sale plus 
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the negative of the return over the same length of time after the sale. The lengths of time before 
trade and after trade are equal and symmetric, which can be 0.5 year or 1 year in our tests. 
As alternative measures of CEO talent proxied by CEO trading performance, we also 
consider the past return and future return measures. For CEO purchase transactions, the past 
return measure is the negative of the return from holding the shares for a certain length of time 
before the purchase, and the future return measure is the return for the same length of time after 
the purchase. For sales transactions, the things on the returns are reversed for each measure. The 
past return measure would capture the contrarian aspect of CEO trading performance. The future 
return measure captures CEO forecasting ability. The three measures are defined in such a way 
that the talent perspective predicts a positive relation between each of them and firm 
performance. 
2.2  Data Sources for CEO Trading Performance: 
2.2.1 CEO Sample 
To construct our talent measure, we collect detailed information on purchases and sales 
by CEOs from Thompson Financial Insider Filing Data where have all corporate insider trading 
activities reported on SEC From 3, 4 and 5. We collect firm-CEO observations over the period 
1996-2011. In fact, Rubin and Vedrashko sample only covers a ten-year period (1996-2006). To 
get suitable data, we first discard firms that are not in the CRSP database 1.5 years before and 
one year after the transaction (one year is the longest time horizon we used in our test and the 
extra 0. 5 years are for estimation purposes in the abnormal returns model). We also eliminate 
those insignificant cases where CEO traded only once or transactions whose values are under 
$500 and whose number of shares is under 100. Lastly, the amount of time between the first and 
last trades needs to be at least two years in order for the CEO to run the company long enough to 
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have an effect on the firm’s performance. These filters help concise our sample size to 4707 
CEOs. 
2.2.2   Raw Return and Abnormal Return 
As mentioned above, CEO trading performance is measured by returns, either raw returns 
or abnormal returns. We decide to use both of them to ensure the robustness of our results. 
Abnormal returns for CEO trading performance measures are computed by both the Fama-
French four-factor model and CAPM respectively. In the Fama-French four-factor model, risk-
free rate, three Fama-French (Fama and French, 1993) factors-market, style, size and the fourth 
factor-momentum that is derived from Carhart (Carhart,1997) model are all acquired from 
Kenneth French’s website. In the CAPM model, the expected return on the market is the value-
weighted return from CRSP. Raw and abnormal returns around the trades have been calculated 
using Eventus.  Since the objective of our test is to compare CEOs to each other rather than the 
same CEOs across different years, we aggregate the trading performance of each CEO over the 
whole sample period by weighting each trade by its dollar value. By doing this, we obtain a 
single value-weighted timing measure for each CEO. That is, our analysis is based on the cross-
sectional variation among CEOs. 
2.3 Firm Performance and Firm-Level Controls 
We use stock market-based measure of performance, which is based on stock returns 
from CRSP, as well as a variety of firm-level controls whose importance has been documented in 
the literature. All measures are at calendar year-end. 
Since the firm performance depends both on industry performance and CEO’s own 
ability to run the company, we use industry-adjusted returns to measure firm performance. 
Relative to the same benchmark (industry), we are able to compare whether a firm is ran by its 
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CEO better than the other. That is, we analyze whether the difference between firm returns and 
the industry return can be attributed to CEO’s ability. 
To give each firm the benchmark (industry), we classify each firm in the sample to one of 
48 Fama-French industries based on their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Then we 
download firm’s monthly holding period returns (HPR) (including dividends) from CRSP and 
monthly returns for Fama-French 48-industry portfolios from the Kenneth French’s website. 
After calculating the annual return for each firm and annual return for each industry, we can 
generate industry-adjusted return by subtracting the corresponding Fama-French industry annual 
return from firm’s annual HPR. 
3. Summary Statistics 
Over the period of 1996-2011, 4,707 CEOs made 94,216 transactions, of which 68,379 
are sales (72.58%). Table 1 shows the summary statistics for raw returns and abnormal returns 
based on the CAPM as well as the Fama-French four-factor model. The results in the table 
indicate that CEOs demonstrate positive timing, past and future measures and better trading 
performance than average investors: According to all timing measures, 74％ to 81% of the CEOs 
are associated with a positive timing measure.   In additional, the positive past measure indicates 
that CEOs are in general contrarian investors, and the positive future measure indicates that 
CEOs are good forecasters of future performance of their firm’s stock.  
4. Empirical Model Description 
In this section, we develop a simple model for the relationship between CEO talent and 
firm performance. Our model is based on recent work by Rubin and Vedrashko (2011).   
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We analyze the relationship between firm performance and CEO trading performance 
both in short-term and long-term, which refer to the time series and the cross-sectional analyses 
with dates t=1, 2...15. 
4.1 The short-term (time-series) model 
The short-term (time-series) model is described by the following equation:,                    
                 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                             (1) 
where the independent variable is Pi, which stands for the CEO i’s trading performance measure 
and equals to the value-weighted average of the timing, past, or future return measure as 
mentioned in section 2.1 . The time variable t takes value 1, 2, … ,15 as our sample period. The 
dependent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the one-year industry –adjusted BHAR (%) of holding the specific 
company’s stock in year t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  are the control variables which include firm Size, Book to 
market, Volatility of returns in year (t-1) and Dependent. Size is the log of the market value of 
each company at the end of each calendar year. Book –to-market is the book value of total 
shareholder equity divided by the market value of equity at the end of each calendar year. 
Volatility is the log of the standard deviation of daily returns of holding shares of a company. 
Dependent is the lag of the dependent variable relative to the year t in order to control for 
possible momentum effects or mean reversion in the industry. The short time analysis is made 
using CEO –clustered errors (Petersen, 2009). 
Both our sets of talent proxies and controls, as well as our outcome variables, are 
described in the data section. 
4.2 The long-term (cross-sectional) model 
Since this model’s implications are cross-sectional, we take the average of the dependent 
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variables and control variables for each firm over the time period to estimate the long-term 
(cross-sectional) model, which is described as follows:      
                                        𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                (2) 
In this model, the independent variables are the same as those in model (1). Importantly, 
the control variables are also the same as in model (1), but without the lagged dependent variable 
because we removed the time dimension in model (2). 
In each test, we include a number of controls for firm and CEO characteristics, such as 
firm size, BM, volatility of returns that have been found to be important covariates of outcomes 
in previous studies. We control for firm size in all of the regressions since the earlier research 
shows that it is more probable for CEOs who are more talented to work for bigger firms because 
they can bring more profits for shareholders in this kind of firms (Himmelberg and Hubbard, 
2000). Book-to-market is also a control variable we take into account according to the findings 
show that much of insider’s abnormal trading performance is related with small and high book to 
market forms (Jenter, 2005; Lakonishol and Lee, 2001; Rozeff and Zaman, 1998). As powerful 
CEOs can be associated with firm performance which is more volatile (Adams et al., 2005), we 
also regard stock return volatility as a control variable in order to reduce the possibility that our 
relation results of CEO trading performance and firm performance are associated with CEOs 
who are more powerful rather than more talented. Another reason we take volatility as a control 
variable is that CEOs are exposed to unsystematic risk. We obtain these firm-specific variables 
from the Compustat annual database as well as CRSP. 
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5. Empirical Results  
The talent hypothesis predicts that the coefficients on CEO trading measures are positive, and the 
expropriation hypothesis predicts that they are negative or equal to zero. 
5.1 Full Sample Results -Timing Measure  
 
The estimated results of short-term model (1) are shown in Panel A of Table 2. 
Specifically, as for the timing measure, the results are mixed that raw returns of CEO trading 
have positive and significant correlations to firm industry-adjusted annual return as we expect, 
while CEO abnormal returns show negative correlation with firm return. The long term 
estimation results in Panel B show that raw return is consistent with our expectation given their 
positive and significant coefficients with firm performance.  To summarize, it is difficult to 
conclude that whether a CEO’s talent perspective dominates the expropriation perspective based 
of the timing measure of CEO talent due to dispersed testing results.  
The coefficient of control variable Size is negative which means that small firms achieve 
higher industry-adjusted annual returns than large firms do in short term analysis, while the 
situation is opposite in long term analysis because firms which could perform better in the 
industry could achieve higher market value in the full sample period. The signs on Book-to-
market are also opposite. Besides, high volatility firms have better performance than low 
volatility firms in both analyses. We further find that the lagged dependent variable has a 
negative correlation with current firm industry-adjusted return, which implies that returns of 
firms in an industry are likely to revert to the mean return of the industry. 
5.2 Full Sample Results-- Past Return and Future Return Measures Separately  
When separately evaluating past return and future return measures, we find the past 
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return measure is fairly consistent with the talent perspective as the significant positive 
coefficients shown in Panel D of Table 2, but this is not the case for the future return measure 
that gives us quite a few significant negative relationships in Panel E. It is possible that these 
results indicate that past returns capture CEO talent and valuation ability, while post-trade 
returns indicate the expropriation motive for CEO trades.  
5.3 Subsample Results-- Purchases and Sales 
 
A potential pitfall of regressing firm’s industry-adjusted returns on CEO trading 
measures is that the correlation between them can be mechanical since both of the variables are 
based on the firm’s stock returns. Since the returns in the trading measures have opposite signs 
for purchases and sales, if the correlation is mechanical, it would result in opposite signs for 
purchases and sales in the regression. We separate the full sample to purchases only subsample 
and sales only subsample. For the tests of the talent hypothesis to be valid, positive correlations 
between CEO trading measure and firm performance must be present in both subsamples.  
All the regression results of purchases are shown in Panel A of Table 3. In Panel A.1, the 
mixed regression results are largely consistent with our expectation. To be specific, for the 
timing measure, all coefficients except the one on the six-month money market measure show 
positive and significant correlation with firm performance.  Then we can find results of past 
return measure and future return measure for the purchases only subsample from Panel A.2 and 
Panel A.3. Only the half-year abnormal return based on CAPM model suggests the positive and 
significant correlation with firm industry-adjusted return in Panel A.2, other regression results 
provide very little support with our expectation. In Panel A.3, for future return measures, the 
results of one-year abnormal return based on CAPM model and raw returns are positive, 
consistent with our expectation. 
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Then we look at the estimation results for the sales only subsample. In Panel B.1, the one 
year abnormal return based on Fama-French model and CAPM model do not indicate a positive 
and significant relationship with firm performance and have insignificant coefficients. For other 
results of raw returns or abnormal returns, we can find positive and very significant coefficients 
with firm industry-adjusted returns. According to the positive significant coefficients shown in 
Panel B.2, our idea that CEOs are contrarians and the firm performance is positively associated 
with CEO’s managerial talent gets support. However, in Panel B.3, the regression results are 
different from our expectations due to the negative relationships displayed. 
5.4 Out-of-Sample Results 
 
We also measure whether CEO trading performance can predict future firm performance 
under that CEO in an out-of-sample test. Table 4 reports the results of this out-of-sample analysis. 
We calculate the CEO trading measures based on the first three years of CEO trades. Then we 
estimate models (1) and (2) the firm returns during period starting one year after the three years 
period of the CEO measure and end with CEO’s last trade in the sample period. This procedure 
changes the sample significantly because it eliminates CEOs with fewer than five years of trades, 
leaving approximately a quarter of the original observations in the sample. Surprisingly, the only 
statistically significant (although, negative) coefficients we find are on the one-year abnormal 
measure that is based on CAPM model. Unfortunately, as for economic meaning, the really small 
coefficients imply no important impact on dependent variable.  
6. Conclusions and Implications 
CEOs could achieve better trading performance than the outside investors since they can 
have private information about the firm. On one hand, expropriation takes place when the CEO 
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achieves the better performance by superior access to information. On the other hand, if CEOs 
achieve better trading performance in the firm’s stock based on their ability to interpret 
information, CEOs have the talent to find the misvaluation of the firm and provide successful 
managerial performance for the firm.  
In this paper, we first revisit the relation between the CEO trading performance and firm 
performance using the timing, past, and future measures of CEO trading performance. Different 
from Rubin and Vedrashko, we got a mix of positive and negative coefficients for the timing 
measure in the full sample for all transactions, which could not support enough for the idea that 
talent perspective dominates the expropriation perspective, if the timing measure is the 
appropriate proxy of CEO talent. 
Then we make some contribution to Rubin and Vedrashko’s paper by separating the 
timing measure of sum returns to past returns and future returns as measures of CEO trading 
performance to try to estimate whether CEOs who are good contrarian investors or good 
forecasters can run their firms better. Our regression results provide strong evidence that our idea 
is true for contrarian CEOs. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 
CEO Trading Performance 
 
Median return is the median (%) of the CEO timing measure, past return measure and future return 
measure. Percent positive is the percentage of CEOs whose timing measure, past return measure, and 
future return measure is positive. The timing measure is the raw or abnormal return of holding (shorting) 
a share of the company’s stock for one year or six months following the date of purchase (sale) plus the 
abnormal return of shorting (holding) the share for one year or six months prior to the purchase (sale) date. 
The past return measure is the raw or abnormal return of shorting (holding) the share for one year or six 
months prior to the purchase (sale) date. The future return measure is the raw or abnormal return of 
holding (shorting) a share of the company’s stock for one year or six months following the date of 
purchase (sale). CEO abnormal return is the value-weighted (by transaction value) abnormal return based 
on the market or four-factor Fama-French model. 
 
 Raw return Market model Four Factors model 
 6 mos 12 mos 6 mos 12 mos 6 mos 12 mos 
Median return 
(timing measure) 
21.23 34.53 16.96 26.65 15.90 25.93 
Percent positive 
(timing measure) 
80.92 80.39 78.59 76.48 74.89 74.06 
Median return 
(past return) 
20.24 34.09 4.52 3.78 4.41 3.28 
Percent positive 
(past return) 
83.43 83.41 68.67 53.81 57.68 52.50 
Median return 
(future return) 
1.28 1.71 11.97 22.08 10.54 21.37 
Percent positive 
(future return) 
52.84 52.28 70.21 68.66 67.58 67.79 
 
 
  
 23 
Table 2 
CEO Trading Measures and Firm Performance - Full Sample 
In Panels A, C, and E the dependent variable is the firm’s industry-adjusted annual return (%), which 
equals the firm’s annual holding period return (including dividends) minus the corresponding Fama-
French industry annual return. In Panels B, D, and F, the dependent and control variables are averaged 
over years to produce one observation per CEO. The timing, future return, and past return measures are 
defined in Table 1. The numbers 365 and 183 in the names of CEO performance measures stand for one 
year and six month measures, respectively. mm stands for CEO abnormal return calculated by estimating 
the market model (CAPM), and ff stands for CEO abnormal return calculated by estimating the four-
factor Fama-French model. In Panel A and Panel B, the regressions are estimated only for the CEO 
timing measure, and in Panels C, D, E and F, the regressions are estimated only for CEO past return and 
CEO future return measures, respectively. Size is the log of the market value of the firm. Book-to-market 
is the book value of equity divided by the market value of the equity. Volatility is the log of the standard 
deviation of daily returns. The t-statistics in parentheses are calculated with CEO clustered standard 
errors in Panel A and Huber-White robust standard errors in Panel B. Coefficients whose significance is 
at the 5% level or less are indicated in bold.  
 
Panel A: Short term relation between firm performance and timing measures 
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
-0.0181 
(-0.54) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 -0.0067 
(-0.27) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  1.3602 
(2.84) 
 
 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   -0.0010 
(-2.36) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.6185 
(2.00) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     1.7406 
(3.00) 
Size (t-1) -2.7969 
(-8.37) 
-2.8007 
(-8.39) 
-2.7924 
(-8.39) 
-2.7994 
(-8.38) 
-2.7849 
(-8.35) 
-2.8029 
(-8.39) 
Book-to-Market 
(t-1) 
4.8620 
(3.59) 
4.8630 
(3.59)  
4.9524 
(3.63) 
4.8633 
(3.59) 
4.8903 
(3.60) 
4.9276 
(3.62) 
Volatility (t-1) 480.4952 
(9.26) 
479.4376 
(9.25) 
453.9553 
(8.76) 
479.1840 
(9.24) 
472.6776 
(9.15) 
459.5824 
(8.93) 
Dependent (t-1) -3.9306 
(-6.09) 
-3.9295 
(-6.09) 
-4.0778 
(-6.43) 
-3.9303 
(-6.09) 
-3.9553 
(-6.12) 
-3.9919 
(-6.17) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 
R-squared 0.06179 0.062 0.0638 0.0618 0.0621 0.0628 
 
 
 
 24 
Table 2 Continued –Panel B: Long term relation between firm performance and timing measures  
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
0.0018 
(0.09) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 0.0143 
(1.07) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  1.3542 
(5.69) 
   
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   -0.0030 
(-18.83) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.6566 
(5.43) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     1.6809 
(6.60) 
Average Size      2.5238 
(20.01) 
2.5238 
(19.98) 
2.4828 
(19.54) 
2.5282 
(20.02) 
2.5277 
(20.05) 
2.4855 
(19.97) 
Average Book-to-
Market  
-1.1350 
(-2.29) 
-1.1320 
(-2.28)  
-0.9250 
(-1.89) 
-1.1390 
(-2.29) 
-1.0800 
(-2.19) 
   -1.0004 
(-2.06) 
Average Volatility  644.6962 
(25.42) 
644.1561 
(25.35) 
604.9401 
(22.98) 
644.6561 
(25.37) 
633.9210 
(25.39) 
615.6811 
(25.36) 
Number of 
observations 
30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 
R-squared 0.0702 0.0703 0.0845 0.0703 0.0730 0.0770 
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 Table 2 Continued –Panel C: Short term relation between firm performance and Past return measure 
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
0.0018 
(1.89) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 0.0012 
(4.65) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  1.5324 
(1.78) 
   
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   0.0001 
(4.47) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.0569 
(0.31) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     0.7549 
(0.97) 
Size (t-1) -2.7908 
(-8.35) 
-2.7991 
(-8.38) 
-2.7869 
(-8.40) 
-2.7990 
(-8.38) 
-2.7995 
(-8.38) 
-2.7995 
(-8.40) 
Book-to-Market 
(t-1) 
4.8630 
(3.59) 
4.8626 
(3.59)  
4.8770 
(3.61) 
4.8633 
(3.59) 
4.8633 
(3.59) 
4.8616 
(3.60) 
Volatility (t-1) 481.3735 
(9.28) 
479.7256 
(9.25) 
452.7442 
(8.59) 
479.1498 
(9.24) 
479.0246 
(9.24) 
472.2850 
(9.09) 
Dependent (t-1) -3.9314 
(-6.09) 
-3.9276 
(-6.08) 
-4.1427 
(-6.36) 
-3.9302 
(-6.09) 
-3.9299 
(-6.09) 
-3.9574 
(-6.12) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 
R-squared 0.0618 0.0618 0.0643 0.0618 0.0618 0.0622 
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Table 2 Continued –Panel D: Long term relation between firm performance and Past return measure 
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
5.718E-4 
(0.64) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 -4.04E-5 
(-0.14) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  1.5567 
(3.14) 
   
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   4.063E-4 
(43.82) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.0432 
(0.50) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     0.7672 
(1.67) 
Average Size      2.5291 
(20.09) 
 2.5244 
(19.99) 
2.4785 
(19.54) 
2.5284 
(20.02) 
2.5251 
(19.97) 
2.5122 
(19.98) 
Average Book-to-
Market  
-1.1360 
(-2.29) 
-1.1350 
 (-2.29)  
-1.0570 
(-2.13) 
-1.1390 
(-2.29) 
-1.1370 
(-2.29) 
   -1.1340 
(-2.30) 
Average Volatility  645.9228 
(25.51) 
644.8542 
(25.39) 
601.2950 
(21.83) 
644.5776 
(25.37) 
644.6640 
(25.43) 
633.9601 
(24.73) 
Number of 
observations 
30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 
R-squared 0.0703 0.0702 0.0887 0.0704 0.0702 0.0730 
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Table 2 Continued –Panel E: Short term relation between firm performance and Future return measure 
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
-0.0017 
(-1.82) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 -0.0011 
(-4.14) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  -0.0996 
(-0.40) 
   
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   -0.0001 
(-4.31) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.2578 
(2.45) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     0.1282 
(0.84) 
Size (t-1) -2.7911 
(-8.36) 
-2.7992 
(-8.38) 
-2.8003 
(-8.39) 
-2.7991 
(-8.38) 
-2.7993 
(-8.38) 
-2.8010 
(-8.39) 
Book-to-Market 
(t-1) 
4.8629 
(3.59) 
4.8626 
(3.59)  
4.8579 
(3.59) 
4.8633 
(3.59) 
4.8758 
(3.60) 
4.8685 
(3.59) 
Volatility (t-1) 481.3455 
(9.28) 
479.7211 
(9.25) 
479.3886 
(9.25) 
479.1536 
(9.24) 
477.5795 
(9.22) 
478.9943 
(9.24) 
Dependent (t-1) -3.9314 
(-6.09) 
-3.9277 
(-6.08) 
-3.9337 
(-6.08) 
-3.9303 
(-6.09) 
-3.9448 
(-6.12) 
-3.9307 
(-6.09) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 29179 
R-squared 0.0618 0.0618 0.0618 0.0618 0.0619 0.0618 
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Table 2 Continued –Panel F: Long term relation between firm performance and Future return measure 
 （1） (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO abnormal 
return (365mm) 
-5.16E-4 
(-0.60) 
     
CEO abnormal 
return (365ff)  
 6.394E-5 
(1.07) 
    
CEO raw  
return (365raw) 
  -0.112 
(-0.78) 
   
CEO abnormal 
return (183mm) 
   -3.62E-4 
(-41.37) 
  
CEO abnormal 
return (183ff)  
               0.2901 
(5.39) 
 
CEO raw  
return (183raw) 
     0.0874 
(0.84) 
Average Size      2.5289 
(20.09) 
2.5243 
(19.99) 
2.5246 
(20.00) 
2.5284 
(20.02) 
2.5212 
(19.98) 
2.5238 
(19.98) 
Average Book-to-
Market  
-1.1360 
(-2.29) 
-1.1350 
(-2.29)  
-1.1470 
(-1.89) 
-1.1390 
(-2.29) 
-1.1040 
(-2.23) 
   -1.1290 
(-2.28) 
Average Volatility  645.8769 
(25.50) 
644.8323 
(25.38) 
645.0524 
(25.40) 
644.5861 
(20.20) 
641.5328 
(25.33) 
615.6184 
(25.37) 
Number of 
observations 
30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 30307 
R-squared 0.0703 0.0702 0.0704 0.0703 0.0713 0.0703 
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Table 3: CEO Trading Measures and Firm Performance – Purchases and Sales 
The dependent variable is annual industry-adjusted or average industry-adjusted return over the sample period and defined as in 
Table 2. In Panel A, the regressions are estimated only for purchases, and in Panel B, the regressions are estimated only for sales. CEO 
return measure are defined in Table 1, and the other variables are defined in Table 2. Coefficients whose significance is at the 5% 
level or less are indicated in bold.  
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  Panel A.1: Firm Performance and Timing Measures: Purchases only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
0.0071 
(10.92) 
0.0083 
(26.67) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  0.0576 
(3.34) 
0.0444 
(6.24) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    6.7025 
(2.09) 
 
5.6950 
(4.53) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
     
 
 -0.0019 
(-4.32) 
-0.0050 
(-36.67) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        5.7445 
(2.09) 
4.0340 
(4.03) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          5.0267 
(2.08) 
3.1158 
(3.64) 
Size 
 
-3.2869 
(-5.10) 
3.1538 
(10.44) 
-3.3278 
(-5.16) 
3.0954 
(10.28) 
-3.7205 
(-5.38) 
2.5667 
(10.08) 
-3.3152 
(-5.14) 
3.1211 
(10.37) 
-3.4639 
(-5.31) 
2.9372 
(9.86) 
-3.5409 
  (-5.37) 
2.9055 
(9.59) 
Book-to-market 
 
8.3323 
(2.79) 
-0.2600 
(-0.31) 
8.3361 
(2.79) 
-2.5300 
(-0.30) 
8.2484 
(2.78) 
-5.7400 
(-0.67) 
8.3353 
(2.79) 
-0.2600 
(-0.31) 
8.3176 
(2.79) 
-0.3220 
(-0.38) 
8.3256 
(2.79) 
-3.1200 
(-0.37) 
Volatility 
 
430.6755 
(-4.82) 
532.4824 
(11.49) 
424.8785 
(5.48) 
524.4655 
(11.34) 
 383.3996 
   (4.94) 
 
466.5298 
(12.03) 
462.8454 
(5.51) 
526.3834 
(11.38) 
405.6849 
(5.39) 
502.9943 
(11.15) 
405.9594 
(5.36) 
505.9728 
(10.99) 
Dependent t-1 
 
 
-4.3625 
(-4.82) 
 -4.3461 
(-4.80) 
 -4.4615 
(-4.74) 
 -4.3421 
(-4.80) 
 -4.4208 
(-4.85) 
 -4.3669 
(-4.84) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of obs. 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 
R-squared 0.0845 0.0531 0.0844 0.0521 0.0883 0.0722 0.0843 0.0523 0.0855 0.0560 0.0854 0.0546 
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Table 3 Continued - Panel A.2: Firm Performance and Past Return Measures: Purchases only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
-0.0004 
(-10.69) 
-3.95E-4 
(-24.42) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  0.0159 
(0.38) 
0.0186 
(1.19) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    -2.1978 
(-0.97) 
-2.6500 
(-3.35) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      0.0002 
(4.48) 
5.20E-4 
(37.38) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        0.6779 
(0.43) 
4.9060 
(0.70) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          -2.7867 
(-0.93) 
-4.2320 
(-3.34) 
Size 
 
-3.2876 
(-5.10) 
3.1525 
(10.44) 
-3.3240 
(-5.15) 
3.0949 
(10.29) 
-3.2136 
(-4.96) 
 3.2611 
 (10.87) 
-3.3151 
(-5.14) 
3.1210 
(10.37) 
-3.3169 
(-5.16) 
3.0984 
(10.28) 
-3.2130 
  (-4.91) 
3.3014 
(10.84) 
Book-to-market 
 
8.3353 
(2.79) 
-2.5400 
(-0.30) 
8.3457 
(2.79) 
-0.2360 
(-0.28) 
8.3917 
(2.81) 
-0.1130 
(-0.13) 
8.3353 
(2.79) 
-0.2600 
(-0.31) 
8.3599 
(2.80) 
-0.2250 
(-0.27) 
8.3592 
(2.80) 
-0.1730 
(-0.21) 
Volatility 
 
430.7712 
(5.55) 
532.5378 
(11.49) 
424.4388 
(5.48) 
522.3616 
(11.45) 
434.1147 
(5.58) 
538.8825 
(11.66) 
462.8315 
(5.51) 
526.3454 
(11.38) 
421.6312 
(5.44) 
520.7314 
(11.45) 
433.3205 
(5.57) 
540.5531 
(11.65) 
Dependent t-1 
 
 
-4.3612 
(-4.82) 
 -4.3424 
(-4.80) 
 -4.4296 
(-4.92) 
 -4.3421 
(-4.80) 
 -4.3551 
(-4.80) 
 -4.4027 
(-4.91) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 
R-squared 0.0844 0.0530 0.0843 0.0520 0.0863 0.0583 0.0843 0.0523 0.0843 0.0519 0.0847 0.0587 
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Table 3 Continued - Panel A.3: Firm Performance and Future Return Measures: Purchases only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
115) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
0.0003 
(10.79) 
3.771E-4 
(24.64) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  0.0015 
(0.03) 
-0.0100 
(-0.46) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    13.0318 
(2.02) 
12.3858 
(6.02) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      -0.0002 
(-4.47) 
-4.66E-4 
(-37.32) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        1.2685 
(0.64) 
0.9094 
(1.10) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          14.7515 
(2.34) 
13.8178 
(6.82) 
Size 
 
-3.2875 
(-5.10) 
3.1526 
(10.44) 
 
-3.3232 
(-5.15) 
3.1005 
(10.30) 
-3.4452 
(-5.03) 
2.6739 
(9.56) 
-3.3152 
(-5.14) 
3.1210 
(10.37) 
-3.3662 
(-5.24) 
3.0751 
(10.22) 
-3.3760 
(-5.18) 
2.8726 
(9.52) 
Book-to-market 
 
8.3351 
(2.79) 
-0.2540 
(-0.30) 
8.3367 
(2.79) 
-2.4300 
(-0.29) 
8.4979 
(2.87) 
-2.9900 
(-0.36) 
8.3353 
(2.79) 
-0.2600 
(-0.31) 
8.2864 
(2.78) 
-0.3190 
(-0.38) 
8.4265 
(2.86) 
-0.2610 
(-0.32) 
Volatility 
 
430.7674 
(-4.82) 
532.5365 
(11.49) 
426.9038 
(5.52) 
524.9873 
(11.51) 
383.7511 
(4.87) 
451.4156 
(11.43) 
462.8454 
(5.51) 
526.3493 
(11.38) 
432.5951 
(5.53) 
533.0241 
(11.53) 
399.1839 
(5.24) 
478.4343 
(10.39) 
Dependent t-1 
 
 
 -4.3613 
  (-4.82) 
 -4.3424 
(-4.80) 
 -5.0903 
(-4.86) 
 -4.3421 
(-4.80) 
 -4.3362 
(-4.80) 
 -4.4208 
(-4.85) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 10018 10525 
R-squared 0.0844 0.0530 0.0843 0.0518 0.0961 0.1273 0.0843 0.0523 0.0845 0.0524 0.0845 0.0873 
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Table 3 Continued - Panel B.1: Firm Performance and Timing Measures: Sales only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(u) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
0.2159 
(0.67) 
0.5577 
(2.67) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  -0.0168 
(-0.83) 
0.0061 
(0.51) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    10.2053 
(7.94) 
11.5194 
(21.46) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      7.1537 
(3.11) 
10.8531 
(9.68) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        8.5063 
(3.55) 
11.5697 
(10.52) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          7.9137 
(3.39) 
11.0891 
(10.05) 
Size 
 
-5.0113 
(-8.74) 
0.9543 
(5.88) 
-5.0137 
(-8.74)) 
1.0178 
(6.09) 
-4.4688 
(-8.02) 
1.0006 
(6.76) 
-4.7398 
(-8.35) 
1.1738 
(7.27) 
-4.7084 
(-4.64) 
1.1752 
(7.24) 
-4.7522 
  (-8.40) 
1.0810 
(6.73) 
Book-to-market 
 
5.3196 
(2.11) 
-3.3210 
(-3.51) 
5.3112 
(2.10) 
-3.3620 
(-3.51) 
5.2394 
(2.10) 
-3.9200 
(-4.50) 
5.2289 
(2.07) 
-4.0350 
(-4.23) 
  5.2561 
(2.08) 
-3.8980 
(-4.08) 
5.1926 
(2.06) 
-4.1860 
(-4.38) 
Volatility 
 
502.3876 
(5.51) 
747.5248 
(21.58) 
510.9505 
(5.61) 
788.1407 
(23.25) 
281.1929 
(4.94) 
341.3627 
(10.57) 
431.7464 
(4.72) 
589.6539 
(17.51) 
420.4148 
(4.64) 
587.7615 
(17.82) 
416.5338 
(4.53) 
572.4525 
(16.73) 
Dependent t-1 
 
 
-3.7303 
 (-3.72) 
 -3.6667 
(-4.80) 
 -5.3030 
(-5.60) 
   -4.0004 
(-4.01) 
 -3.9669 
(-3.98) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 
R-squared 0.0622 0.1131 0.0621 0.1039 0.0773 0.2403 0.0643 0.1393 0.0653 0.1451 0.065 0.1424 
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Table 3 Continued - Panel B.2: Firm Performance and Past Return Measures: Sales only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
0.0084 
(4.90) 
-0.0080 
(-1.62) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  0.0016 
(9.66) 
3.336E-4 
(1.64) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    14.5723 
(11.52) 
15.3793 
(29.43) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      0.2167 
(0.11) 
0.6749 
(0.77) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        3.8267 
(2.12) 
4.3724 
(5.04) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          15.2755 
(4.22) 
18.1041 
(11.67) 
Size 
 
-5.0008 
(-8.71) 
0.9880 
(6.04) 
-5.0114 
(-8,74) 
1.0185 
(6.09) 
-4.4479 
(-8.04) 
0.8581 
(6.17) 
-5.0132 
(-8.74) 
1.0216 
(6.12) 
-4.9489 
(-8.61) 
1.0957 
(6.59) 
-4.6423 
  (-8.13) 
1.0348 
(6.59) 
Book-to-market 
 
5.3076 
(2.10) 
-3.3460 
(-3.50) 
5.3095 
(2.10) 
-3.3700 
(-3.51) 
5.2118 
(2.10) 
-3.8030 
(-4.79) 
5.3095 
(2.10) 
-3.3910 
(-3.53) 
5.1530 
(2.04) 
-3.8410 
(-3.93) 
5.0794 
(2.01) 
-4.4560 
(-4.58) 
Volatility 
 
514.1119 
(5.64) 
779.6051 
(23.45) 
511.4432 
(5.62) 
789.3211 
(23.26) 
231.1634 
(2.75) 
266.1199 
(9.19) 
510.5749 
(5.69) 
791.1970 
(23.62) 
510.5984 
(5.59) 
790.8947 
(23.28) 
360.8665 
(4.05) 
490.1938 
(14.47) 
Dependent t-1 
 
 
-3.6398 
  (-3.61) 
 -3.6648 
(-3.64) 
 -6.2486 
(-6.63) 
 -3.6687 
(-3.63) 
 -3.6387 
(-3.60) 
 -4.4133 
(-4.44) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of 
observations 
15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 
R-squared 0.0622 0.1052 0.0622 0.1039 0.0893 0.3220 0.0621 0.1041 0.0628 0.1111 0.0710 0.1924 
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Table 3 Continued - Panel B.3: Firm Performance and Future Return Measures: Sales only 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
-0.0076 
(-4.04) 
0.0081 
(1.69) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  -0.0015 
(-9.77) 
-2.95E-4 
(-1.44) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    -32.9700 
(-7.95) 
-27.8710 
(-14.87) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      6.7311 
(2.22) 
9.8657 
(8.42) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        5.9493 
(2.27) 
9.2180 
(9.26) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          -46.2994 
(-9.73) 
-38.9660 
(-21.34) 
Size 
 
-5.0022 
(-8.72) 
0.9864 
(6.04) 
-5.0116 
(-8.74) 
1.0185 
(6.09) 
-5.4932 
(-9.44) 
0.7704 
(4.78) 
-4.7623 
(-8.30) 
1.1065 
(6.69) 
-4.9004 
(-8.67) 
0.9795 
(6.10) 
-5.4169 
  (-9.33) 
0.8327 
(5.09) 
Book-to-market 
 
5.3080 
(2.10) 
-3.3440 
(-3.50) 
5.3095 
(2.10) 
-3.3700 
(-3.51) 
5.3222 
(2.12) 
-2.8170 
(-3.24) 
5.3501 
(2.12) 
-3.6030 
(-3.85) 
5.5224 
(2.18) 
-2.7870 
(-3.00) 
5.3105 
(2.10) 
-2.8300 
(-3.02) 
Volatility 
 
513.9601 
(5.64) 
778.8035 
(23.43) 
511.4358 
(5.62) 
789.2859 
(23.26) 
618.4469 
  (6.16) 
 
924.0639 
(24.09) 
420.4224 
(4.90) 
572.0394 
(16.61) 
446.5278 
(4.71) 
624.1002 
(18.50) 
605.0467 
(6.18) 
906.2107 
(25.62) 
Dependent t-1 
 
-4.3613 
(-4.82) 
 -3.6647 
(-3.64) 
   -4.2317 
(-4.23) 
 -4.0047 
(-3.87) 
 -3.9526 
(-4.08) 
 -4.1920 
(-4.15) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 15979 16343 
R-squared 0.0622 0.1054 0.0622 0.1039 0.0746 0.1692 0.0641 0.1329 0.0631 0.1214 0.0726 0.1590 
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Table 4: CEO Performance and Out of Sample Firm Performance 
The dependent variable is annual industry-adjusted or average industry-adjusted return over the sample period and defined as in Table 
2. In Panel A, the regressions are estimated only for the CEO timing measure, and in Panels B and C, the regressions are estimated for 
CEO past return and CEO future return measures, respectively. CEO return measures are defined in Table 1, and the other variables 
are defined in Table 2. In this table, the CEO measures are estimated based on trades during the first three years after the CEO’s first 
trade. The regressions are then run on the period from the fourth year after the first trade to the year of the last trade by the CEO. 
Coefficients whose significance is at the 5% level or less are indicated in bold.  
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Panel A: Timing Measures and Out-of-Sample Firm Performance 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
-0.0051 
(-2.63) 
-0.0050 
(-4.34) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  -0.0275 
(-0.48) 
-0.0280 
(-0.67) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    0.0812 
(0.47) 
-0.1067 
(-1.58) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      0.1338 
(0.41) 
0.2190 
(0.95) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        0.1392 
(0.43) 
0.0025 
(1.12) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          0.1324 
(0.41) 
0.1976 
(0.87) 
Size 
 
-3.2086 
(-4.87) 
0.2283 
(0.68) 
-3.2117 
(-4.87) 
0.2262 
(0.67) 
-3.2057 
(-4.86) 
0.2317 
(0.69) 
-3.2029 
(-4.85) 
0.2387 
(0.71) 
-3.2017 
(-4.85) 
0.2426 
(0.72) 
-3.2035 
(-4.85) 
0.2363 
(0.70) 
Book-to-
market 
 
1.9450 
(0.71) 
-0.8680 
(-0.82) 
1.9359 
(0.70) 
-0.8820 
(-0.83) 
1.9672 
(0.71) 
-0.8290 
(-0.78) 
1.9534 
(0.71) 
-0.8510 
(-0.80) 
1.9533 
(0.71) 
-0.8500 
(-0.80) 
1.9534 
(0.71) 
-0.8530 
(-0.81) 
Volatility 
 
420.3520 
(3.95) 
547.5000 
(6.43) 
420.6775 
(3.94) 
548.4001 
(6.43) 
417.4995 
(3.88) 
543.6630 
(6.35) 
418.5183 
(3.92) 
545.2058 
(6.42) 
418.6940 
(3.93) 
545.4913 
(6.43) 
418.4521 
(3.92) 
545.1451 
(6.42) 
Dependent t-1 
 
-5.7074 
(-4.41) 
 -5.7018 
(-4.41) 
 -5.6900 
(-4.39) 
 -5.6984 
(-4.41) 
 -5.6978 
(-4.41) 
 -5.6982 
(-4.41) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num of obs. 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 
R-squared 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0534 0.0524 0.0534 0.0524 0.0535 0.0524 0.0536 0.0524 0.0535 
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Table 4 (continued) - Panel B: CEO Past Return Measure and Out-of-Sample Firm Performance 
 (1) 
Industry 
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
0.0003 
(3.31) 
2.636E-4 
(6.63) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  0.0009 
(0.43) 
0.0010 
(0.78) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    0.0814 
(0.42) 
0.0935 
(0.73) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      -0.0646 
(-0.23) 
-0.0710 
(-0.34) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        0.0568 
(0.19) 
0.1104 
(0.51) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          0.2205 
(0.63) 
0.2761 
(1.13) 
Size 
 
-3.2083 
(-4.87) 
0.2286 
(0.68) 
-3.2101 
(-4.87) 
0.2276 
(0.68) 
-3.2108 
(-4.89) 
0.2248 
(0.67) 
-3.2114 
(-4.88) 
0.2253 
(0.67) 
-3.2070 
(-4.42) 
0.2322 
(0.69) 
-3.2071 
(-4.87) 
0.2294 
(0.68) 
Book-to-market 
 
1.9459 
(0.71) 
-0.8670 
(-0.82) 
1.9431 
(0.71) 
-0.8730 
(-0.82) 
1.9631 
(0.71) 
-0.8410 
(-0.79) 
1.9532 
(0.71) 
-0.8550 
(-0.81) 
1.9458 
(0.71) 
-0.8720 
(-0.83) 
1.9487 
(0.71) 
-0.8670 
(-0.82) 
Volatility 
 
420.2874 
(3.95) 
547.458 
(6.43) 
419.966 
(3.95) 
547.668 
(6.43) 
417.487 
(3.86) 
543.947 
(6.34) 
419.3875 
(3.94) 
546.361 
(6.40) 
419.505 
(3.95) 
546.863 
(6.43) 
417.7345 
(3.92) 
544.347 
(6.42) 
Dependent t-1 
 
-5.7069 
(-4.42) 
 -5.6983 
(-4.41) 
 -5.6884 
(-4.38) 
 -5.6980 
(-4.41) 
 -5.7028 
(-4.42) 
 -5.6946 
(-4.40) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 
R-squared 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0534 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0536 
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Table 4 (continued) - Panel C: CEO Future Return Measure and Out-of-Sample Firm Performance 
 (1) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(2) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(3) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(4) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(5) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(6) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
(7) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(8) 
Average 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(9) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
 
(10) 
Average 
industry-
adjusted 
return 
(11) 
Industry-
adjusted 
return 
(12) 
Average 
industry 
adjusted 
return 
CEO abnormal 
return(365mm) 
 
-0.0003 
(-3.30) 
-2.5E-4 
(-6.61) 
          
CEO abnormal 
return(365ff) 
 
  -0.0009 
(-0.43) 
-0.0010 
(-0.78) 
        
CEO raw 
return(365raw) 
 
    0.1007 
(0.16) 
0.2251 
(0.63) 
      
CEO abnormal 
return(183mm) 
 
      0.2003 
(0.65) 
0.2837 
(1.52) 
    
CEO abnormal 
return(183ff) 
 
        0.1434 
(0.30) 
0.2432 
(0.87) 
  
CEO raw 
return(183raw) 
 
          -0.3919 
(-0.42) 
-0.2530 
(-0.46) 
Size 
 
-3.2083 
(-4.87) 
0.2286 
(0.68) 
-3.2101 
(-4.87) 
0.2275 
(0.68) 
-3.2028 
(-4.96) 
0.2435 
(0.72) 
-3.2065 
(-4.86) 
0.2314 
(0.69) 
-3.2071 
(-4.87) 
0.2328 
(0.69) 
-3.2222 
(-4.92) 
   0.2185 
   (0.65) 
Book-to-market 
 
1.9459 
(0.71) 
-0.8670 
(-0.82) 
1.9428 
(0.71) 
-0.8740 
(-0.82) 
1.9533 
(0.71) 
-0.8440 
(-0.80) 
1.9717 
(0.72) 
-0.8140 
(-0.77) 
1.9592 
(0.71) 
-0.8310 
(-0.78) 
1.9336 
(0.70) 
-0.8800 
(-0.83) 
Volatility 
 
420.2909 
(3.95) 
547.4609 
(6.43) 
419.9914 
(3.95) 
547.6988 
(6.43) 
419.5897 
(3.95) 
547.0665 
(6.43) 
417.3973 
(3.90) 
542.9533 
(6.35) 
418.8541 
(3.92) 
545.4084 
(6.40) 
419.6374 
(3.95) 
546.6837 
(6.42) 
Dependent t-1 
 
-5.7069 
(-4.42) 
 -5.6984 
(-4.41) 
 -5.7035 
(-4.42) 
 -5.6852 
(-4.39) 
 -5.6947 
(-4.40) 
 -5.6994 
(-4.41) 
 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Number of 
observations 
7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 7910 7966 
R-squared 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0533 0.0524 0.0534 0.0524 0.0537 0.0524 0.0534 0.0524 0.0533 
 
